e," and noted that "the doctrine has been a part of the common law of New York for nearly a century" and that "[c]ourts [*9]have repeatedly used it to prevent the postjudgment restraint of assets situated in foreign branch accounts based solely on the service of a foreign bank's New York branch." (See 24 NY3d at 162.)
Urban avers that the purpose of section 7-103 (2) is to ensure that deposits are easily recoverable in New York by tenants once a judgment has been obtained against a landlord. Royal does not dispute these concerns, but claims that the separate entity rule is more concerned with foreign (i.e., non-U.S. based) branches, not branches in another state. Royal also contends that the deposit does not qualify as a "security deposit" under section 7-103. Neither argument has merit.
{**53 Misc 3d at 463}With respect to the latter argument, section 7-103, despite referring to a security deposit by way of example, applies to a broad range of deposited money so long as the money is for "the use or rental of real property as security for performance of the contract or agreement or to be applied to payments upon such contract or agreement when due." (General Obligations Law § 7-103 [1].) While the security deposit was to be used as liquidated damages if termination under the rider occurred, those same funds were also earmarked to be used as a classic security deposit if the sublease was consented to by the City. Royal cites no case nor provides any authority that a deposit earmarked for multiple uses is not governed by section 7-103. The court finds that section 7-103 applies to the security deposit.