NY3d 472, 477-478 [2011]). Thus, we{**99 AD3d at 51} decline to dismiss the sixth, eighth and tenth causes of action as against defendant Barnes.
Defendants contend that the retaliation claims (the seventh and ninth causes of action) should be dismissed as against the Dakota and Barnes for failure to state a cause of action. The State HRL provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]t shall be . . . unlawful . . . to retaliate . . . against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article" (Executive Law § 296 [7]). To make out a claim of retaliation under the State HRL, the complaint must allege that (1) Fletcher engaged in a protected activity by opposing conduct prohibited thereunder; (2) defendants were aware of that activity; (3) he was subject to an adverse action; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 312-313 [2004]).
The City HRL provides in, pertinent part, that "[i]t shall be . . . unlawful . . . to retaliate . . . in any manner against any person because such person has . . . opposed any practice forbidden under this chapter" (Administrative Code § 8-107 [7]). "The retaliation . . . complained of under this subdivision need not result in an ultimate action . . . or in a materially adverse change . . . [but] must be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity" (id.).