Lee v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals & Review, 423 A.2d 210 (1980)

Citation: Lee v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals & Review, 423 A.2d 210 (1980)
Parent Document: Lee v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals & Review, 423 A.2d 210 (1980)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1980-11-06
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2000618/lee-v-district-of-columbia-boar... ↗

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. The injury in fact requirement originally evolved as a mechanism to enforce the mandate of Article III of the Constitution that federal courts have jurisdiction only in “cases” and “controversies.” See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204-05, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Public Citizen v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 184 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 139, 565 F.2d 708, 714 (1977). This court, of course, is not bound by the mandates of Article III, since it was created by Congress as an Article I court. See D.C.Code 1973, § 11-102(2)(A); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973). In creating this court, however, Congress provided that we, like the federal courts, should hear only “[cjases and controversies.” D.C.Code 1973, § 11-705(b); see United States v. Cummings, D.C.App., 301 A.2d 229, 231 (1973). Therefore, the injury in fact requirement is a logical and appropriate component in the test for standing before this court. Cf. District of Columbia v. Walters, D.C.App., supra, at 338 n.13 (the court, without citing D.C.Code 1973, § 11 -705(b), nevertheless *217applied the injury in fact analysis “to promote sound judicial economy” and in recognition of the concept “that an adversary system can best adjudicate real, not abstract, conflicts”).

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