defendants argue that the tenants, not successor landlords, comprise the class for whose benefit General Obligations Law § 7-105 was intended. Of course, a provision for criminal penalties does not necessarily mean that criminal penalties are the exclusive consequence of a statutory violation (see e.g. Izzo v Manhattan Med. Group, P.C., 164 AD2d 13, 16 [1990], lv dismissed 77 NY2d 989 [1991]). Nor does it follow that because a tenant is an intended beneficiary of a statute a successor landlord cannot similarly be an intended beneficiary. As this Court has stated, "[W]hen a statute imposes a duty, any person having a special interest in the performance thereof may sue for a breach which caused him damage" (Hopkins v Amtorg Trading Corp., 265 App Div 278, 283 [1942]).
Defendants argue, alternatively, that even if a private right of action exists under the statute, plaintiffs still lack standing since ownership of the security deposits at all times remains with the tenants who advanced the deposits. The specific language of General Obligations Law § 7-105 makes it clear, however, that grantees, assignees, successors and receivers all have the same rights with respect to the transfer of security deposits, including standing to compel such transfer (see Tischler v Key One Corp., 67 AD2d 886 [1979]). As successor landlords, {**12 AD3d at 94}plaintiffs were directly injured by defendants' refusal to turn over the tenants' security deposits and have [*7]standing to enforce their rights under General Obligations Law § 7-105.