paragraph 44 of the lease (see generally Daniel Finkelstein and Lucas A. Ferrara,
Landlord and Tenant Practice in New York §7:20 [2002 ed.]). However, if
Broadway LLC failed to turn over the security deposit to petitioner, Broadway LLC, and not
petitioner, would be liable to respondent for its return.
If at trial, the evidence establishes that respondent is liable for the amount sought in the
petition and that the security deposit was not transferred to petitioner, respondent would still be
required to satisfy the judgment against it and then commence a separate plenary action against
Broadway LLC to recover the amount paid to satisfy the judgment. Such a result is nonsensical
and a waste of judicial resources.
CPLR 401 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]fter a [special] proceeding is commenced, no
party shall be joined or interpleaded and no third-party practice or intervention shall be allowed,
except by leave of court."
Although there is authority for the proposition that Civil Court does not have jurisdiction to
allow third-party practice in summary proceedings as there is no provision in the RPAPL to
incorporate a third-party judgment in a final order (see Gorman v Gorman, 77 Misc 2d
687, 688 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1974]), other judges have exercised their discretion to permit
such practice (see Lawrence v Martin, 131 Misc 2d 256 [Civ Ct, NY County 1986];
Manhattan Plaza, [*4]Inc. v Snyder, 107 Misc 2d 470 [Civ
Ct, NY County 1980]).
While the aforementioned cases permitting third-party practice were in furtherance of public
policy and to ensure proper housing maintenance standards in summary nonpayment proceedings
involving residential tenants, and the instant case does not present such implications, this Court