the opportunity to avoid this situation by timely filing his petition against HPD. Finally, this court could still render an effective judgment [factor 5] in the absence of HPD, by ordering the respondent to allow Mr. Clark to remain in the building, without affecting any of HPD's established policy. Hence, under all the attendant circumstances herein, the court finds, pursuant to CPLR § 1001 (b), that the factors justifying the continuance of the proceeding in HPD's absence weigh in favor of Mr. Clark.
An Article 78 proceeding challenging a decision of an administrative agency must be commenced within four months after that decision becomes final and binding. (See CPLR § 217). The respondent erred in claiming that Mr. Clark's filing of his request eight months after the final judgment, barred his actions due to the closing of the statute of limitations. The eviction decision became final and time began to toll 10 days after the November 21, decision, [*4]rather than the July 21, decision. Therefore, Mr. Clark's March 20, 2007 petition was timely as to the respondent. It is noted that Mr. Clark's claim would fall outside the statute of limitations with regards to HPD (rather than Respondent). However, since the court has determined that the action can proceed in HPD's absence this statute of limitations as to HPD alone will not serve to bar Mr. Clark's request.