The petitioner argues that even if required to serve the VAWA notice and certification form, the respondent waived the right to seek dismissal on those grounds since said defense was never specifically raised in the respondent's answer. The petitioner avers a predicate notice to an eviction, like a termination notice, is a condition precedent to a proceeding and is a waivable defense. The respondent argues a general denial requires the petitioner to prove their prima facie case and as such all elements of the petitioner's cause of action must be made out which includes [*5]compliance with statutory notice requirements.
"Because a summary proceeding is a statutory proceeding (see RPAPL art 7), relief can be granted to a petitioner only where all the elements of the petitioner's cause of action have been made out, a requirement which is sometimes referred to as 'jurisdictional' (see e.g. Matter of Blackgold Realty Corp. v Milne, 69 NY2d 719, 721 [1987] [a nonpayment petition which did not allege compliance with the Multiple Dwelling Law's registration requirement was 'jurisdictionally defective']; Gonzalez v Peterson, 177 Misc 2d 940, 941 [App Term, 1st Dept 1998], affd sub nom. Dass-Gonzalez v Peterson, 258{**84 Misc 3d at 726} AD2d 298 [1999] [the absence of a lease provision permitting termination deprives the court of 'jurisdiction']; see also Merrbill Holdings, LLC v Toscano, 59 Misc 3d 129[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50410[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2018] [in a summary proceeding, a default judgment cannot be granted upon facially insufficient papers])" (1646 Union, LLC v Simpson, 62 Misc 3d 142[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50089[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).