In seeking summary judgment, defendants argue that the First Lease is invalid because (i) it
lists the Trust, rather than the Trustees, as Owner of the Subject Apartment; (ii) it was not signed
by the Trustees in their fiduciary capacity; and (iii) it violates General Obligations Law
§5-703 (the "Statute of Frauds"). Defendants also contend that, while the allegations in the
Amended Complaint are based on the First Lease, the Second Lease expressly voids the First
Lease.
As such, defendants argue that the Amended Complaint, based on the First Lease, fails to
state a viable cause of action. Defendants further argue that, in the absence of a valid lease, they
were, at most, tenants at-will, liable only for use and occupancy during their stay in the Subject
Apartment, which they have already paid.
In addition, defendants assert that, even if the Court determines that the First Lease is valid,
the Trustees are not in privity of contract with them and, therefore, lack standing to enforce the
lease. Defendants also contend that they accepted an offer of early termination without penalty.
Thus, defendants insist that they are entitled to the return of their security deposit.
Defendants challenges to the validity of the First Lease are insufficient to establish
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. To be sure, under Estate, Powers and Trusts Law
§7-2.1(a), "an express trust vests in the trustee the legal estate ...." Furthermore,
§11-1.1(b)(5)(C) authorizes the trustee of an express trust "to lease [property] for a term not
exceeding ten years ...." Here, however, the Court is satisfied that the naming of the Trust, rather
than the Trustees, as Owner of the Subject Apartment is simply the result of a transcription error