requirement, plaintiffs alleged that their claims arise from "the same course of conduct and are
based on the same theories as the other class members" (DeLuca, 134 AD3d at 1536
[internal quotation marks omitted]; see generally Freeman, 12 AD3d at 1171). Plaintiffs
also alleged that they can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class inasmuch as they
do not have conflicting interests with other class members (see generally Ferrari, 153
AD3d at 1592; Cooper v Sleepy's,
LLC, 120 AD3d 742, 744 [2d Dept 2014]). Plaintiffs satisfied the superiority
requirement by alleging that the damages likely suffered by each of the tenants range between
$475 and $4,500, and "the cost of prosecuting individual actions would deprive many of the
putative class members of their day in court" (Ferrari, 153 AD3d at 1593). Thus, we
conclude that the amended complaint contains sufficient allegations to state a class action (see generally Ackerman v New York Hosp.
Med. Ctr. of Queens, 127 AD3d 794, 796 [2d Dept 2015]).
We further agree with plaintiffs that the court erred in granting the motion with respect to the
first cause of action inasmuch as the amended complaint adequately alleges a cause of action for
conversion in violation of General Obligations Law § 7-103 (see generally Milkie v Guzzone, 143
AD3d 863, 864 [2d Dept 2016]). Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges that a landlord failed to
provide written notice of the banking institution that holds the security deposit, an inference that
the security deposit funds were commingled in violation of section 7-103 (1) is permitted (see Paterno v Carroll, 75 AD3d
625, 628 [2d Dept 2010]), and the plaintiff may seek the " 'immediate' return [of the
security deposit] notwithstanding that [the] plaintiff may . . . have breached the