action was premised was plainly in good faith, in that it resulted in a consent order for the [*7]correction of violations in the Apartment. These facts are sufficient
to establish a presumption of retaliatory eviction that, unless rebutted by evidence, (Salvan v
127 Management Corp., 101 AD2d 721 [1st Dept 1984], app. dism., 63 NY2d 773
[1984]). The remaining question as to this defense, therefore, is whether petitioner has offered
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption. To determine whether petitioner has done so, the
court must "determine if the landlord's decision to evict the tenant was reached independently of
the activities of his tenant protected by ordinance," (Cornell v. Dimmick, 73 Misc 2d 384
[Binghampton City Court 1973]).
Here, petitioner offered no testimonial evidence in rebuttal after the close of
respondent's defense case. To the extent that petitioner addressed the defense of retaliatory
eviction, it did so during the cross-examination of Oliva, and through the submission of an
affidavit of a member of the law firm representing petitioner, which the parties stipulated to
permit. The affidavit relates to email received from a representative of petitioner.
Oliva testified that in January 2009, he asked the landlord to make repairs, at a time
when there was no heat, hot water or electricity stopped coming to the apartment. He stated that
the landlord responded that it could do nothing, and that repairs were ultimately made by
workers from the City of New York. Oliva stated that he received the Termination notice in
February 2009, while the HP action was pending,
During cross-examination, Oliva denied that he was asked to move the first time he
met Farkas, and stated that he was asked to move when he brought the landlord to court. Oliva