strong public policy considerations.
A judgment is a bar not because a party has done some act which precludes him from
asserting a right or title; it is properly a bar on principles of public policy, because the peace and
order of society, the structure of our judicial system, and the principles of our government
require that a matter once litigated should not again be drawn into question between the same
parties or their privies. The doctrine of res judicata rests on two maxims that A man should not
be twice vexed for the same cause,' and that It is for the public good that there be an end to
litigation.' A party whose interests are placed in jeopardy by a trial has a right to judicial
immunity from the consequences of further trials involving the same issues. The rule of res
judicata does not rest wholly on the narrow ground of technical estoppel nor on the presumption
that former judgment was right and just, but on the broad ground of public policy that requires a
limit to litigation, like the statute of limitations, it is a rule of rest.
Evans v. Monaghan (dissent), 282 AD 382,392-393 (1st Dept. 1953)
citing 2 Freeman on Judgments, § 626.
Moreover Petitioner timely asserted the defense in the motion practice that resulted in the
November 2008 Restoration Order. Additionally, even though res judicata is considered
to be an affirmative defense, courts may sua sponte dismiss a cause of action based on
res judicata where appropriate (390 West End Avenue Associates v. Youngsten,
221 AD2d 292 [1st Dept 1995][affirming courts sua sponte dismissal based on res judicata
where a prior judgment operated as a bar to the action]; (Modica v. Zergebel, 160
AD2d 689 [2nd Dept 1990]).
Moreover the parties may not stipulate to prevent the court from applying the doctrine where