On the disparate treatment claim, the court found the allegations from plaintiff's probationary year were time-barred because they were not part of a continuing pattern of discriminatory conduct. It also found that plaintiff had attended at least nine one- or two-day training courses, and did not allege that she suffered any injury as a result of not attending more. Finally, it found that plaintiff accepted a promotion offered in May 2004, and had not claimed that she would have been promoted earlier had she taken more classes. The court characterized the disparate treatment claim as missing the necessary element of an "adverse employment action." (Id. at *5.)
Evaluating the retaliation claim, the court found that a one-time assignment to perform a task arguably within plaintiff's duties did not constitute retaliation, and that the other claims did not involve being treated differently from workers who had not complained.
We agree with the court's analysis as it pertains to plaintiff's state claims under the Executive Law. The decision dismissing the action failed, however, to properly construe plaintiff's claims under the Restoration Act,[FN1]
which mandates that courts be sensitive to the distinctive language, purposes, and method of analysis required by the City Human Rights Law (City HRL), requiring an analysis more stringent than that called for under either title VII or the State Human Rights Law (State HRL). In{**61 AD3d at 66} light of this explicit legislative policy choice by the City Council, we separately analyze plaintiff's City HRL claims.
I. Requirements and Purposes of the Restoration Act
While the Restoration Act amended the City HRL in a variety of respects,[FN2]