In opposition to respondent's motion, petitioner does not deny any of the facts asserted by respondent in support of her motion for summary judgment. It merely submits its attorney's affirmation arguing that although 512 East 11th Street HDFC v Grimmet, supra, held that government involvement was sufficiently present therein to trigger due process requirements, "...that is not to say that any and all HDFC's require this pleading mandate," and that "[t]he involvement of the HDFC with the government is fact specific issue [sic] and one that is not ripe for summary dismissal or adjudication." Petitioner's counsel also asserts that this matter is not ripe for summary judgment because respondent has not yet filed her answer. This last statement is demonstrably false, as exhibited by respondent's answer in the court file stamped by the Clerk of the Court on August 9, 2006, and containing an affidavit of service dated August 8, 2006, upon petitioner's counsel.
Pursuant to CPLR 3212, a grant of summary judgment is permissible in cases where there is clearly no material and triable issue of fact presented. Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 (1957); Di Menna & Sons, Inc. v City of New York, 301 NY 118 (1950). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue, Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223 (1978).