t exist"]).
It remains true that a landlord renting real property in New York has an unwavering and absolute obligation to comply with the laws relating to security deposits. The obligation here is consistent with general principles of New York law which do not permit a cofiduciary to claim exemption from responsibility based upon passivity, ignorance of the law, or even the contrary advice of counsel (see, Matter of Rothko, 43 NY2d 305, 320 [1977] [a cofiduciary "who knows that (another cofiduciary) is committing breaches of trust and not only fails to exert efforts directed towards prevention but accedes to them is legally accountable even though . . . acting on the advice of counsel"]).
Accordingly, no argument has been presented which would defeat the right of plaintiffs to recover the security deposit from the co-owner who stands before the court.
Conclusion
The standard for evaluating motions for summary judgment is well established.
"To obtain summary judgment it is necessary that the movant establish [a] cause of action or defense 'sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment' in [movant's] favor (CPLR 3212, subd [b]), and [movant] must do so by tender of evidentiary proof in admissible form" (Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 1067 [1979]).
The plaintiffs have met their burden and the motion for summary judgment is granted.
Plaintiffs are awarded judgment against defendant Janina Pearse on the cause of action for conversion in the amount of $21,000. The calculation of interest thereon, and the balance of the claims, are severed and shall continue. Costs and disbursements shall be held in abeyance to abide the event.
Footnotes