"[t]he tenant or respondent shall not be entitled to the stay unless he [or she] shall deposit with the clerk of the court the rent then due, which shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed the same as the tenant was liable for during the preceding month or such as is reserved as the monthly rent in the agreement under which he [or she] obtained possession of the premises."
Petitioner argues that respondent must pay all rents currently due, which are alleged to be $59,331.81, to meet the deposit requirement. At argument on the motion, respondent's attorney opposed the deposit of the full rent due to obtain a stay.
Upon interpreting the plain language of RPAPL 755 (2), the court does not find that a full deposit of all rent due is required to invoke the stay (see Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 [2000] [The "unambiguous language of (the) statute is alone determinative" of the legislature's intent]). Indeed, the statute specifically deems "the rent then due" to be "the same as the tenant was liable for during the preceding month or such as is reserved as the monthly rent in the agreement under which" the tenant obtained possession (RPAPL 755 [2] [emphasis added]). This is distinguishable from other sections of article 7 of the RPAPL, which refer specifically to payment or deposit of "the full amount of rent due" (RPAPL 731 [4]; 749 [3]) as being required to moot out a case prior to the hearing or effectuate vacatur of the warrant, respectively (see Matter of Walsh v New York State Comptroller, 34 NY3d 520, 524 [2019] ["A statute 'must be construed as a whole and . . . its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each{**83 Misc 3d at 758} other' "], quoting Matter of New York County Lawyers' Assn. v Bloomberg, 19 NY3d 712, 721