covered housing unit prior to expiration of the notice period.” Id. at 673. The court stated,
“Here, Congress unambiguously provided that ‘the lessor’ may not require a tenant to vacate
prior to providing a 30-day notice.” Id.
The court reasoned that if 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1) “simply prevented the eviction of
tenants for 30 days following notice, without providing tenants the ability to cure the breach or
vacate the premises during that period, the notice provision would be rendered meaningless.” Id.
at 674. The court emphasized that the purpose of the notice requirement not only was to notify
the tenant of the alleged breach, but to provide a period of time during which the tenant could
cure the alleged breach. Id. The court stated that under the landlord’s interpretation, the 15
U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1) would provide no additional protection because the landlord could
commence an unlawful detainer action if the breach was not cured within 14 days. Id. at 674-75.
Pendleton Place argues that the analysis in Sherwood Auburn should be limited to cases
involving nonpayment of rent because the eviction in that case was for nonpayment. But as
discussed above, 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1) applies to situations beyond nonpayment of rent. And
Division One did not limit its analysis to rent nonpayment cases.
Pendleton Place also makes a slightly different argument than the landlord made in
Sherwood Auburn. Pendleton Place argues that it complied with 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1) because
it waited 30 days after the last 10-day notice before filing the unlawful detainer action. But
9
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
No. 58118-3-II
Pendleton Place’s notices told Asentista that he was required to vacate the premises within 10