Order Page 1 of 4
23-CV-02816 Execusuite, LLC v. Mitchel Cable et al
Plaintiff then rented the apartment to somebody else, with a move-in date of July 1, 2020. On
June 23, 2020, several of plaintiff’s agents entered the apartment and removed Mr. McFadden’s
remaining personal belongings. Plaintiff’s agents moved Mr. McFadden’s belongings to a different
storage-unit location.
On June 29, 2020, Mr. McFadden returned to the apartment and found that the locks had been
changed. He demanded entry from plaintiff’s agent, and called police. Defendants Mitchel Cable and
Karl Ebbighausen responded to the scene as law-enforcement officers for the Hartford Police
Department. After listening to both sides, defendants told plaintiff’s agent that Mr. McFadden still had
a right of possession to the apartment, and that Mr. McFadden should be permitted to resume
possession. Mr. McFadden thereafter moved his personal belongings back from the storage unit into
the apartment. He then left.
Plaintiff’s agent then promptly removed Mr. McFadden’s property from the apartment, moved
it back to the storage-unit location, and changed the locks again.
Mr. McFadden then returned to the apartment that same afternoon. He found that the locks had
been changed. He called police. Defendants Eric Clifford and Joshua Reyes responded to the scene as
law-enforcement officers for the Hartford Police Department. After listening to both sides, defendants
again told plaintiff’s agent that Mr. McFadden still had a right of possession to the apartment, and that
Mr. McFadden should be permitted to resume possession. Mr. McFadden thereafter moved his
personal belongings back from the storage unit into the apartment. He then left.
On July 4, 2020, the new tenant began moving into the apartment. She discovered Mr.
McFadden’s property inside the apartment. She called police. Defendants Cable, Clifford, and
Ebbighausen responded to the call as law-enforcement officers for the Hartford Police Department and
told the new tenant that Mr. McFadden was still in possession of the apartment. The new tenant packed
up her belongings and left. Defendants then spoke with one of plaintiff’s agents and told them that
advertising the apartment as available during the month of July could constitute the criminal offense of
false advertising.
As a result of these interactions, no one lived at the apartment during the month of July, but
plaintiff charged double rent. Plaintiff charged Mr. McFadden rent for the month, and his belongings
remained there. Plaintiff also charged the new tenant rent for the month, and kept her security deposit,
and charged her an additional “lease buyout fee.” Plaintiff rented the apartment to somebody else
beginning on August 1, 2020.
In this § 1983 action, plaintiff’s theory is that Mr. McFadden abandoned the apartment on June
7, 2020 when he removed his furniture and furnishings from the apartment and left behind two
carloads of personal items. Plaintiff contends that defendants thereafter wrongfully deprived plaintiff
of possession of the apartment by allowing Mr. McFadden to continue using the apartment, by telling
the new tenant that someone else was still living there, and by telling plaintiff that advertising the
apartment as available for rent during the month of July 2020 could constitute the criminal offense of
false advertising.