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INTERNAL PROTOTYPE — NOT LEGAL ADVICE — DO NOT SEND

Moorcroft v. Severance (2018)

Citation
Moorcroft v. Severance (2018)
Parent Document
Moorcroft v. Severance (2018)
Jurisdiction
Vermont (state)
Effective Date
2018-03-12

Other Sections in This Document (73)

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    significant portion of the advanced sums were used for the Pride Auto businesses. Back
    up documentation for Shirley’s summaries was only given for 2006, but even in that
    single year it is clear she made significant, still unpaid, advances for Pride Auto
    equipment and expenses. Exhibit 19 shows over $50,000 in readily recognizable Pride
    Auto expense advances by Shirley in 2006, and there might be several more Pride Auto-
    related advances in that year if the Exhibit 19 entries had been fully explained. As the
    sums Shirley and Arthur are owed are not part of this suit, the issue was not explored and
    is not relevant as to the issues between the suit parties. As noted in the Legal Analysis
    section below, even if a general partnership were found, Pride Auto creditors would be
    paid at liquidation (including judicial dissolution) before the partnership’s partners.
62. To the extent John might claim general partner status in the Pride Auto businesses, he
    cannot disclaim knowing about the business advances Shirley continued to make. John
    testified that he knew about those Pride Auto advances and cautioned Shirley against
    making them. Yet John did not protest to the extent such advances fueled the finances of
    the businesses in which he claims a one half partner ownership interest (see Legal
    Analysis) .
63. The court finds that John has failed to prove by a preponderance that he had any
    partnership interest in the Pride Auto businesses ventures or businesses. To the extent
    John might have made loans to Jim and the companies, John has not asserted those claims
    in his counterclaim to recover such loans. The loan repayments status thus remains
    unresolved – see Legal Analysis section.
64. Although the Life Lease precluded Jim from allowing liens against the Subject Property,
    in 2005 and 2009 he gave mortgages to his parents which were recorded. The mortgages
    refer to promissory notes but none were signed (or if signed, none were ever introduced
    into evidence). The recorded mortgages recite sums owed by Jim to his parents of
    $150,000 (Exhibit E, Mortgage from 3/28/05) and later $208,815.96 (Exhibit F from
    10/28/06). Per Shirley’s loose accounting of sums she was owed from her son (Exhibit
    18), she and Arthur were owed $230,659 at the end of 2004 and $244,499 by the end of
    2005.
65. These mortgages secured prior, lawfully owed unsecured debt owed to the senior
    Moorcrofts, but the grant of the mortgages without consent of the Severances violated the
    Life Lease. Jim may have granted these mortgages, not to get the upper hand as to the
    Severances, but to ward off Prime Auto or personal creditors who might be after Jim to
    collect sums he owed as a sole proprietor of the Pride Auto businesses.
66. Jim did not get the Severances advance written consent before giving the mortgages,
    contrary to the Life Lease.
67. As of the dates the Mortgages were given and recorded, Jim had previously executed the
    Life Lease to the Severances and it was recorded. When the Mortgages were granted,
    the Severances had prior perfected conveyed life estates in the Subject Property, that Jim
    had conveyed away in 2001. Thus the 2005 and 2006 mortgages only encumbered Jim’s
    portion of the Subject Property that he had not conveyed away in 2001. They do not
    directly encumber, and are subject to, the Severances’ Life Lease joint life estate
    interests.