the intent of the parties. Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn.2d 657, 663, 801 P.2d 222 (1990). We
determine intent by focusing on the objective manifestation of the parties in the written contract.
Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 503, 115 P.3d 262 (2005).
Accordingly, we consider only what the parties wrote; giving words in a contract their ordinary,
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No. 53352-9-II
usual, and popular meaning unless the agreement as a whole clearly demonstrates a contrary intent.
Id. at 503-04. A contract “should be construed as a whole and, if reasonably possible, in a way
that effectuates all of its provisions.” Colo. Structures, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the W., 161 Wn.2d 577,
588, 167 P.3d 1125 (2007) (footnote omitted).
Here, the one-year rental agreement executed between TST and Lane, which became
effective on July 1, 2016, states,
The monthly rent shall be increased only by prior written notice of three months or
more preceding the beginning of any month or period of tenancy. In case of increase
of rent, it is understood that all other provisions of this agreement shall remain in
full force, changed only by the increased in the amount of rent.
AR at 62. The rental agreement does not state that the rental increases are limited to annually nor
does the rental agreement set forth any specified amount of rental increase or any specified formula
upon which the increase will be calculated. Thus, although former RCW 59.20.060(2)(c) allows
for rent increases if the initial term of a rental agreement is for one year or more, Lane’s rental
agreement fails to comply with former RCW 59.20.060(2)(c) because it fails to limit rental