Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — D2 52293-4-II Published Opinion.pdf

Citation: Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — D2 52293-4-II Published Opinion.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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(9th Cir. 2003)).

Here, Mackey’s termination occurred just 12 days after she complained to Tilton about

Krall’s behavior. We conclude that this proximity in time between the complaint and the

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No. 52293-4-II

termination is sufficient to create a reasonable inference that, for purposes of showing a prima

facie case, retaliation was a substantial factor in the decision to terminate Mackey. See Estevez,

129 Wn. App. at 799-800 (concluding that nine days between the employee’s complaint and her

termination was sufficient temporal proximity to establish a prima facie case of retaliation).

5. Prima Facie Case – Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy

To establish a prima facie case of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, an

employee must show (1) that his or her “ ‘discharge may have been motivated by reasons that

contravene a clear mandate of public policy,’ ” Martin, 191 Wn.2d at 725 (quoting Thompson,

102 Wn.2d at 232), and (2) that the public-policy-linked conduct was a significant factor in the

decision to discharge the worker. Martin, 191 Wn.2d at 723. However, wrongful discharge

claims generally are limited to four categories:

“(1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where
employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury
duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such
as filing workers’ compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in
retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.”

Id. (quoting Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931, 936, 913 P.2d 377 (1996)).4

a. Whistleblower Status