Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — D2 49631-3-II Published Order.pdf

Citation: Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — D2 49631-3-II Published Order.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2049631-3-II%20Published%20Order.pdf ↗

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Steilacoom, Loveless, and Schaub argue that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim

should be dismissed because Billings’s termination did not rise to the level of outrage. As support

for the motion for summary judgment, Steilacoom, Schaub, and Loveless included exhibits from

the arbitration, and the arbitration award.

Billings opposed the motion for summary judgment and argued that collateral estoppel

should not preclude any of his claims because it would cause an injustice. He also argued that his

claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy remained viable. Billings submitted

a declaration opposing the motion, listing numerous alleged factual inaccuracies in the arbitration

award.

Billings also included a declaration of Glen Carpenter, a sergeant and defensive tactics

instructor with the Pierce County Sheriff’s Office. Carpenter stated that Schaub told him about an

internal affairs investigation of Billings. Carpenter gave Schaub his opinion as to whether Billings

would have been justified to use deadly force during a certain stop. Carpenter stated that although

Billings would have been justified to use deadly force, Billings did not utilize the best tactical

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49631-3-II

approach or technique that would be commonly trained. Carpenter concluded that Billings’s stop

did not constitute an unlawful use of force.

Steilacoom, Schaub, and Loveless filed a motion to strike Carpenter’s declaration. They

argued that it was irrelevant, duplicative, and inadmissible. They further argued that Carpenter’s

declaration did not create an issue of material fact because the arbitrator did not conclude that