recognized American Indian tribes from suit absent explicit and unequivocal
waiver or abrogation by congress.” Young v. Duenas, 164 Wn. App. 343, 348-
349, 262 P.2d 527 (2011). “Sovereign immunity extends not only to the tribe
itself, but also to tribal officers and tribal employees, as long as their alleged
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No. 83456-8-I/9
misconduct arises while they are acting in their official capacity and within the
scope of their authority.” Young, 164 Wn. App. at 349.
The Nooksack Tribe is not being sued here, but employees and officials of
the tribe are being sued. Dodge, Gilliland, Ashby, and John and Jane Does 1-
10’s acts (finalizing orders, serving documents, attempting to inspect the house,
etc.) throughout the eviction process were performed within “their official capacity
and within the scope of their authority.” See Young, 164 Wn. App. at 349.
Evidence submitted by the defendants—and not, as far as the record on appeal
indicates, contested by the plaintiffs—establishes that the Nooksack Tribal Court
and Nooksack Tribe Police Department have authority to issue eviction notices to
tenants living in tribally-owned residences on trust land. The Rabangs instead
contend that the State has assumed civil jurisdiction under Public Law 280. But,
“RCW 37.12.010 and Public Law 280 do not extend the State’s jurisdiction to
sovereign tribal governments, their entities, or their employees.” Young, 164 Wn.
App. at 353.
The Rabangs contend that sovereign immunity “does not apply to these
personal capacity claims against four non-members.” But the court looks to the
activity, not the pleaded defendant. Young, 164 Wn. App. at 349 (“ ‘Plaintiffs . . .