Section 70-33-433

Citation: Section 70-33-433
Parent Document: Westview v. Lockhart & Greener MT v. Cunningham, 2023 MT 201 (2023)
Jurisdiction: Montana (state)
Effective Date: 2023-10-31
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9436506/westview-v-lockhart-greener-mt-... ↗

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To conclude that the Legislature intended to exclude mobile home tenancies from no-cause
terminations, the Court refers to legislative history regarding a prior version of the Act,
§ 70-24-441 (2003), which included language explicitly precluding mobile home tenancies from
notice terminations. Opinion, ¶ 18. However, that provision was repealed, 2007 Mt. Ch. 267, and
no such language exists in the current Code. If anything, this history demonstrates the opposite
legislative intent, but more importantly, the lack of ambiguity in the Act forecloses consideration
of this history. Even so, the Court reasons that it would “be absurd to force a landlord to wait for
noncompliance from a tenant before being allowed to change the use of the land they own or to
evict a tenant for a ‘legitimate business reason.’” Opinion, ¶ 19. I agree that the Court’s second
interpretation of § 70-33-433(1), MCA, is entirely absurd. Although the introductory language of
§ 70-33-433(1), MCA, is prefaced as applying to those situations in which “there is a
noncompliance by the tenant,” the minimum notice periods of the various subsections clearly
illustrate that the subsections of § 70-33-433(1)(l-m), MCA, are not constrained by a tenant’s
violation. Subsections (a-k) require at most 30 days’ notice prior to eviction, while (l-m) require,
at minimum, 180 and 90 days respectively. If subsections (l-m) were indeed contingent on the
tenant’s violation under subsections (a-k), then the landlord would always have a shorter notice
period available under subsections (a-k), thereby rendering the notice periods of (l-m)
superfluous. As the Court notes, we cannot interpret a statute so as to render any language
superfluous. Thus, the Court’s second interpretation is clearly invalid.
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the lease term,” in which case the provision sanctions the party so acting by assessment of

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