Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 709569.pdf

5Pham also argues that the trial court erred in finding that he breached the duty imposed by the
implied warranty of habitability, because the duty requires nothing more than for a landlord to act with
"reasonable diligence to eliminate dangers that pose an actual or potential safety hazard to its
occupants." Br. of Appellant at 12. He contends "'[tjhere is no breach if the landlord's efforts are
reasonable but unsuccessful.'" ]& But the case Pham cites, Lian v. Stalick. 106 Wn. App. 811,818, 25
P.3d 467 (2001), supports neither proposition. Nowhere in Ljan does the court suggest that a finding of
breach is precluded if a landlord merely takes reasonable measures to cure.
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No. 70956-9-1/12

This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v.

Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 346, 68 P.3d 282 (2003). In interpreting statutes, we strive to

discern and implement the Legislature's intent. State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450,

69 P.3d 318 (2003). Where the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, and "the

legislative intent is apparent... we will not construe the statute otherwise." ]d. (citing

State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320 (1994)). Plain meaning, however,

may be gleaned "from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes

which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question." Dep't of Ecology v.

Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).

Pham bases his argument on RCW 59.18.085(3)(c)'s reference to a "notice of

the condemnation, eviction, or displacement order."6 Amicus King County Bar

Association (KCBA) argues that the obligation to pay relocation assistance under