Pearlman v. Gervolino, 234 Conn. App. 18 (2025)

Citation: Pearlman v. Gervolino, 234 Conn. App. 18 (2025)
Parent Document: Pearlman v. Gervolino, 234 Conn. App. 18 (2025)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2025-07-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10647034/pearlman-v-gervolino/ ↗

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under CUTPA. Id., 734. In response, the trial court
‘‘ordered the plaintiffs to submit evidence as to the
portion of the fees requested specifically related to the
CUTPA [claim],’’ which the plaintiffs were unable to do
because of the close factual connection between the
claims. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 735.
Because the plaintiffs were unable to apportion the
fees, the trial court, relying on Jacques All Trades Corp.,
denied their motion for attorney’s fees. Id. In reversing
the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees, this court
distinguished cases in which the factual basis of a
CUTPA claim is integral to, rather than separate from,
the facts underlying other claims. Specifically, this court
held that the trial court improperly relied on Jacques
All Trades Corp. in ordering the plaintiffs to apportion
their attorney’s fees among their claims because, ‘‘[i]n
the present case, the plaintiffs’ breach of contract and
negligence claims were related to their CUTPA claim
because they depended on the same facts.’’ Id., 735; see
also Taylor v. King, 121 Conn. App. 105, 131, 994 A.2d
330 (2010) (‘‘when the facts underlying the CUTPA
claim are indistinguishable from those facts relating to
other claims, § 42-110g (d) encompasses claims related
to the prosecution of a CUTPA claim . . . not only one
claim explicitly labeled as a CUTPA claim’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, in the present case, the defendant’s award of
attorney’s fees pursuant to § 42-110g (d) was limited to
those fees related to the prosecution of the CUTPA
count of his counterclaim. Our review of the defendant’s
affidavit, however, reveals that his request for attorney’s
fees was not limited to only those fees. For example,
some of the fees listed therein were incurred by coun-
sel’s ‘‘[r]eview of [the summary process] case’’ and
‘‘[r]esearch [of] mortgage and federal eviction morato-
rium’’ and the filing of an unsuccessful motion to open
in the summary process action. These fees appear to
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