initial lease, as amended by the prior amendment(s) and, notably, do not define Lease as
including the assignment agreement (see Landlord's exhibit I at 1; Landlord's exhibit J at
1). The second and third amendments did not change the aforementioned paragraphs of the
original lease.
The plaintiff in the federal action alleged that on December 1, 2016, while the Third
Amendment to the Lease was in effect, she attempted to enter the premises but "because of the
architectural barriers at the entrances of the store, s[he] was denied full and equal access to, and
full enjoyment of, the facilities at Defendants' Property" (Landlord's exhibit M at ¶ 12). In
particular, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants' premises violated the ADA because it failed to
(1) "provide an accessible entrance at street level door, due to [a] step at the entrance"; (2)
"install a ramp with appropriate slope and signage"; (3) "provide a safe and accessible means of
egress for emergencies"; (4) "provide adequate directional and accurate informational signage
throughout the Premises"; (5) provide accessible countertops; and (6) "provide signage
addressing people with disabilities informing them that accessible services are provided"
(id. at ¶ 21). As stated above, the matter was settled, without a finding of fault.
The proponent of a motion for summary judgment must "make a prima facie showing of
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the
absence of any material issues of fact" (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324
[1986]). Failure to make this prima facie showing requires denial of the motion, "regardless
of the sufficiency of the opposing papers" (id.). Once this showing has been made, the