However, under section 60 of the Code of the Rent Stabilization Association of New York City, Inc., by which petitioner is bound, a landlord is required, before the expiration of a tenant’s lease, to “offer to renew the lease at a rent not in gxcess of the stabilization rent permitted * * * and otherwise on the same conditions as the expiring lease * * * provided, however [that] * * * (b) upon the request of and with the consent of the tenant, the terms and conditions of a renewal lease entered into after November 1, 1978, may be re-written” (emphasis added). This language confers both a duty on the landlord to offer a renewal lease and a right in the tenant to request and consent to changes in the terms of that renewal lease. The tenant’s right can only be preserved if the landlord complies with its statutory responsibility. Thus, where a landlord fails to offer the tenant a renewal lease, the tenant is prevented from exercising its right to bargain for modification of the lease agreement.
In three of these cases, petitioner apparently seeks to benefit from the situation just described by moving to deny these tenants’ fundamental right to trial by jury in reliance on expired leases containing jury waiver clauses. The moving papers contain no indication that renewal leases were proffered or executed, or that the tenants refused to renew their leases upon demand pursuant to subdivision C of section 54 of the Code of the Rent Stabilization Association of New York City, Inc. Accordingly, this court can only conclude that no renewal leases were offered and that these tenants have been effectively denied their right to negotiate for a deletion of the jury waiver clauses.