CPLR 401 provides, in pertinent part, that “after a [special] proceeding is commenced, no party shall be joined or interpleaded and no third-party practice or in*475tervention shall be allowed, except by leave of court.” This gives the court discretionary authority to allow impleader in a summary proceeding. Incredibly, and in apparent contradiction of this plain language, especially when read together with RPAPL article 7 denominating a summary proceeding a special proceeding in sections 701, 711, 713, 731 and 761 (see 2 Rasch, New York Landlord and Tenant, Summary Proceedings [2d ed], § 994), the Appellate Term, Second Department, in 1975 held “that CPLR 401 was not intended to govern in a summary proceeding” (Zytelny v Lodge, NYU, Feb. 5, 1975, p 17, col 1; cf. 3 Rasch, New York Landlord and Tenant, Summary Proceedings [2d ed], § 1297).
However, RPAPL 747 (subd 1) broadens the power of the court from the days of the Civil Practice Act and Edaviel Corp. v Boykin (supra) (Sessa v Blakney, supra, at p 434) and provides that “the court shall direct that a final judgment be entered determining the rights of the parties.”
Moreover, since October 1, 1973 (the effective date of the Housing Court Act), a revolution has taken place in this area of civil procedure.
In creating the Housing Court, the Legislature set forth a statement of policy, contained in section 1 of chapter 982 of the Laws of 1972, as follows: