The plaintiff landlord sought, by way of summary process, to regain posses-
sion of certain premises leased to the defendant tenants. The plaintiff,
which had entered into a one year residential rental agreement with
the defendants, served them with a notice to quit based on, inter alia,
nonpayment of rent for June, 2016. When the defendants failed to vacate
the premises, the plaintiff initiated a summary process action in July,
2016. Thereafter, in August, 2016, the plaintiff sent a text message to
the defendants asking for the rent, and the defendants moved to dismiss
the action, claiming that the text message rendered the notice to quit
equivocal and that it did not terminate the tenancy. The plaintiff with-
drew the initial action in September, 2016, and on the same day, served
the defendants with a second notice to quit, again on the ground of,
inter alia, nonpayment of rent. Subsequently, the plaintiff initiated a
second summary process action. The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed to this court. They
claimed that the court erroneously rendered judgment for the plaintiff
on the ground of nonpayment of rent when the plaintiff prematurely
served the defendants with the underlying notice to quit on the same
day she withdrew her first summary process action, instead of waiting
nine days after rent became due to serve the notice as required by
statute (§ 47a-15a). Held that because the service of the second notice
to quit failed to comply with the statutory timing requirements, the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s second
summary process action: where, as here, a landlord files a summary
process action based on a notice to quit and subsequently withdraws
the action, the lease is restored, its terms apply prospectively, rent
becomes due on the day the summary process action is withdrawn, and
the reinstatement of the lease triggers a new nine day grace period
within which the tenant must pay rent in order to avoid a summary
process action by the landlord, which must wait nine days after with-
drawing a summary process action before serving the tenant with a new
notice to quit, and although the defendants moved to dismiss the first
action on the ground that the notice to quit had become equivocal and
could not serve as a basis for the pending summary process action, that
issue was not resolved until the plaintiff withdrew that action and, during
the month between the plaintiff’s text message and her withdrawal of
the first action, the question of whether the lease had been reinstated
had not been decided; accordingly, rent became due as of the date of
the plaintiff’s withdrawal of the first action, and the plaintiff’s notice to
quit, which was served on that same day, was premature because it was
served within the nine day grace period provided by § 47a-15a.
Argued March 15—officially released June 19, 2018 Procedural History