2(Emphasis added.) State courts are evenly divided overwhether the trial court may impose an
insanity defense over a defendant's objection. Compare Hendricks v. People. 10 P.3d 1231, 1243-44
(Colo. 2000), with Frendak v. United States. 408 A.2d 364, 379 (D.C. 1979); cf In re Tromblv. 627 A.2d
855, 857 (Vt. 1993) (even though defendant controls the decision whether to request a lesser-included-
offe'nse instruction, court may override defendant's refusal of such an instruction if it "is so ill-advised that
it undermines a fair trial"); see generally David Cohn, Offensive Use ofthe Insanity Defense: Imposing
the Insanity Defense Over the Defendant's Objection, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 295 (Winter 1988).
No. 68168-1-1/10
A rule is " 'new'" under a retroactivity analysis if it" 'breaks new ground' or 'was
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.'"
Markel. 154Wn.2d at 2703 (quoting league, 489 U.S. at 301); see also Chaidez v.
United States U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107, 185 L.Ed. 2d 149 (2013) (citing
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301). Here, there is no dispute the 1983 decision in Jones
announced a new rule of criminal procedure.
When a decision results in a new rule, that rule applies to all criminal cases
pending on direct review. Griffith v. Kentucky. 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 649 (1987). As to convictions that are already final, a defendant can collaterally
attack the conviction only ifthe defendant can establish one of the two exceptions
recognized in Teague. In re Pers. Restraint of Rhome, 172 Wn.2d 654, 666, 260 P.3d
874 (2011), applies. The two Teague exceptions apply to (1) a rule that places certain