V. Plaintiff ’s Claim of Retaliation
To establish retaliation under NYCHRL (Administrative
Code § 8-107 [7]), plaintiff must demonstrate that he partici-
pated in a protected activity, that defendants knew of this activ-
ity and acted adversely against him, and a causal connection
between the protected activity and adverse action. (Executive
Law § 296 [7]; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d
295, 312-313 [2004]; Franco v Hyatt Corp., 189 AD3d 569, 571
[1st Dept 2020]; see Alshami v City Univ. of N.Y., 203 AD3d
592, 593 [1st Dept 2022].) Plaintiff alleges that he notified de-
SIMMONS v VILLAGE PLUMBING [81 Misc 3d 876] 881
fendants he both ‘‘suffered from disabilities as the result of
medical conditions’’ and ‘‘requested reasonable accommodation’’
that resulted in his termination. (Gangat aff exhibit A ¶ 45.)
Defendants do not move to dismiss this claim based on
plaintiff ’s failure to request an accommodation, but instead
maintain that a request for a reasonable accommodation is not
protected activity constituting grounds for a retaliation claim
under New York City Administrative Code § 8-107 (7).
The authority that defendants rely on, however, predated a
2019 amendment to the statute that codified a request for a
reasonable accommodation as protected activity. (Administra-
tive Code § 8-107 [7] [v].) To the extent that defendants rely
on Martinez v New York City Tr. Auth. (2020 NY Slip Op
33116[U], *21-22 [Sup Ct, NY County, Sept. 15, 2020]), the
conduct at issue likely predated the statute. In any event,
Martinez is unpersuasive since it did not consider Administra-
tive Code § 8-107 (7) (v).
[2] Plaintiff also alleges a causal connection between his
protected activity and defendants’ retaliation. Although defend-