Plaintiff Bean, in both her July 7, 2014 email and certified let-
ter (plaintiff’s exhibits 3, 4), correctly relied upon Real Property
Law § 226-b (1) when she requested that defendant consent to
an assignment as opposed to a sublet.
Real Property Law § 226-b (1) provides:
‘‘Unless a greater right to assign is conferred by
the lease, a tenant renting a residence may not as-
sign his lease without the written consent of the
owner, which consent may be unconditionally with-
held without cause provided that the owner shall
release the tenant from the lease upon request of
the tenant upon thirty days notice if the owner
unreasonably withholds consent which release shall
be the sole remedy of the tenant. If the owner
reasonably withholds consent, there shall be no as-
signment and the tenant shall not be released from
the lease.’’
[1] Real Property Law § 226-b (6) provides: ‘‘Any provision of
a lease or rental agreement purporting to waive a provision of
this section is null and void.’’ In short, Real Property Law
§ 226-b expressly prohibits the very lease language prohibiting
an assignment, which defendant now wishes to rely upon. The
provision in defendant’s lease which only allows a tenant to
enter into a sublet, and which completely denies a tenant the
right to assign a lease is ‘‘null and void’’ under Real Property
Law § 226-b (6). Defendant’s only proffered reason for prohibit-
ing plaintiff from assigning her lease is defendant’s own lease
language, which is a legal nullity. Sarah Tytler is no longer
employed by defendant and did not appear as a witness.
Therefore, under Real Property Law § 226-b (1), as plaintiff
provided 30 days’ notice to landlord of her intent to terminate
the lease (as early as June 19, 2014) and since defendant