11
While the Court of Appeals awarded fees pursuant to RCW 59.18.290(2), it is
unclear which provision the superior court relied on. Landlords cited to RCW 59.18.410
at the superior court, CP at 263, and again cite to that provision in their briefing, Suppl. Br.
ofResp'ts at 19. RCW 59.18.410 provides, "If upon the trial the verdict of the jury or, if
the case be tried without a jury, the finding of the court be in favor of the [landlord] ... the
court may award statutory costs and reasonable attorney's fees." That provision further
states, "This section also applies if the writ of restitution is issued pursuant to a final
judgment entered after a show cause hearing conducted in accordance with RCW
59.18.380." Both provisions appear to support an award of attorney fees to the prevailing
landlord.
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For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Faciszewski, et al. v. Brown, et al., 92978-5
to attorney fees and we remand to the superior court to determine the amount of fees
and expenses to be awarded to Tenants. See, e.g., Humphrey Indus., Ltd. v. Clay St.
Assocs., LLC, 176 Wn.2d 662, 677, 295 P.3d 231 (2013) (reversing the trial court's
award of fees); see also RAP 18.l(i); RCW 59.18.290(2).
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the superior court for further
proceedings consistent with our interpretation of the JCEO. That the purpose of the
JCEO is to prevent arbitrary evictions and provide tenants with more protections than
under state law suggests that the tenant's posteviction remedies are not exclusive once
the landlord files a certification. Nothing in the JCEO itself prevents the tenant from
challenging the landlord's certification. Rather, the JCEO expressly requires that the