The city ordinance has the force of law. The difficulty with the plaintiffs ’ position, however, is that it places a responsibility upon them at least equal to that of the landlord. It directs that they vacate the premises and their occupation of the property is unlawful. In the instant case it may be extremely unfair to place this burden upon their shoulders, but the enactment which they muster in support of their causes of action puts them in the unenviable position of unlawfully occupying the very structure upon which this lawsuit is bottomed and on premises where they had no right to be under the mandate of the ordinance.
The plaintiffs argue that the defendant for ‘‘ his own economic benefit rented a dwelling that failed even to meet Building Code Standards of decency ” and made as few repairs as possible to ‘ ‘ maximize his profit ’ ’.
“ The key to the prima facie tort is the inflicting of intentional harm, resulting in damage, without excuse or justification, by an act or a series of acts which would otherwise be lawful. * * * The remedy is invoked when the intention to harm, as distinguished from the intention merely to commit the act, is present, has motivated the action, and has caused the injury to plaintiff, all without excuse or justification.” (Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769.) Abhorrent as the defendant’s conduct may have been, it cannot be the basis for a prima facie cause of action.
The plaintiffs occupied the defendant’s premises from 1960 to 1963. With great reluctance they moved back in 1967 when the premises ‘ ‘ were in an even further dilapidated condition than the time the plaintiffs first occupied the premises in 1960-1963 ’ ’.