Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 389189_pub.pdf

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As recounted above, the December 27 notice was quite lengthy. It cited all four

bases for termination under RCW 59.18.650(2)(c). It also included a detailed summary of

Ms. Daniels’s tenancy, including recitations of the other six notices that had been issued

since August 24, 2020.

Ms. Daniels criticizes the December 27 notice as both over- and underinclusive.

According to Ms. Daniels, the notice should not have included all four bases for eviction

under subsection (2)(c), and instead should have clarified which of the four bases K&H

was relying on. Ms. Daniels also complains the notice should have included an

identification of who was injured by her alleged misconduct, be it a specific neighboring

tenant or the landlord. We disagree with these criticisms.

A challenge to the adequacy of notice presents a mixed question of law and fact,

reviewed de novo. Hall, 178 Wn. App. at 819. Washington courts require landlords to

strictly comply with timing and manner requirements of notice. Id. at 818. But when it

comes to form and content, substantial compliance is sufficient. Marsh-McLennan Bldg.,

Inc. v. Clapp, 96 Wn. App. 636, 640 n.1, 980 P.2d 311 (1999). In terms of substance,

RCW 59.18.650(6)(b) requires any notice under subsection (2) of the statute to “[i]dentify

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For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 38918-9-III
Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

the facts and circumstances known and available to the landlord . . . that support the cause

or causes with enough specificity so as to enable the tenant to respond and prepare a

defense to any incidents alleged.” (Emphasis added.) The critical question here is whether

the landlord’s notice provided enough facts to allow Ms. Daniels to “effectively rebut the