Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 387844_pub.pdf

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(Emphasis added.) In interpreting statutes, a court seeks to fulfill the legislature’s intent.

State v. Haggard, 195 Wn.2d 544, 547-48, 461 P.3d 1159 (2020). The clearest indication

of the legislature’s intent is the plain meaning of the statutory language. State v.

Conaway, 199 Wn.2d 742, 749, 512 P.3d 526 (2022).

RCW 49.60.210(1) prohibits retaliation against “any person” by “any employer.”

The statute contains no qualifier for former employees. The statute admits no exception

for employers who fired an employee or employers who reached a settlement agreement

with current or former employees. Saleh Elgiadi is “any person” under the statute.

WSU is “any employer” under the statute. I need not engage in any exegesis or review

any case law to conclude that the no-reapply clause in Elgiadi’s settlement agreement

violates RCW 49.60.210(1). I do so anyway.

Like all antiretaliation statutes, RCW 49.60.210(l) primarily seeks to maintain

unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms for employment discrimination.

Zhu v. North Central Educational Service District-ESD 171, 189 Wn.2d 607, 614,

404 P.3d 504 (2017). People are less likely to oppose discrimination by bringing claims

or testifying if the law does not extend them protection against retaliation. Allison v.

Housing Authority, 118 Wn.2d 79, 94, 821 P.2d 34 (1991). Thus, in order to encourage

people to oppose discrimination, we afford RCW 49.60.210, the antiretaliation statute,

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For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 38784-4-III
Elgiadi v. Washington State University

liberal construction. RCW 49.60.020; Zhu v. North Central Educational Service District-

ESD 171, 189 Wn.2d 607, 614 (2017). If anything, antiretaliation provisions should be